(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;

(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;

(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;

(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;

(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;

(g) When the CA’s findings are contrary to those by the trial court;

(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;

(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;

(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or

(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.

Ferraren v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159328, October 5, 2011 (Third Division)

Still, the award of attorney’s fees to the winning party lies within the discretion of the court, taking into account the circumstances of each case.  This means that such an award should have factual, legal, and equitable basis, not founded on pure speculation and conjecture.  Further, the court should state the reason for the award of attorney’s fees in the body of the decision.  Its unheralded appearance in the dispositive portion is, as a rule, not allowed.

Here, however, although the RTC did not specifically discuss in the body of its decision its basis for awarding attorney’s fees, its findings of fact clearly support such an award.  For instance, the RTC found, based on the record, that Bongar persistently and clearly violated the terms of its contract with Alcatel.  It failed to finish the works by October 29, 1991, the stipulated date.  It sought on December 1, 1991, more than a month after it was in violation, to finish its job by May 31, 1992, an extra seven months for just a three-month project.  Worse, when Alcatel had to take over the job to save its own undertaking to PLDT, Bongar refused to return to Alcatel the uninstalled materials that it provided for the works.[3]  Alcatel was forced to litigate to protect its interest.

Alcatel v. Bongar, G.R. No. 182946, October 5, 2011 (Third Division)

Since no appeal is allowed in contempt proceedings, the petitioner filed a motion to post bond and to quash the warrant of arrest on the ground that he has already filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. The motion was denied by the trial court on the ground that no copy of the petition was attached to the motion showing that indeed such a petition was filed with the Supreme Court consistent with Sec. 2, Rule 71, Rules of Court.

In resolving the petition, the Supreme Court ruled:

(a) A pleading containing derogatory, offensive and malicious statements submitted to the court or judge wherein proceedings are pending is considered direct contempt.

(b) Denial of the ex parte motion to post bond and quash warrant of arrest is proper because the petitioner failed to show proof that he has indeed filed the petition with the Supreme Court, and the records show that the ex parte motion was filed ahead of the petition for certiorari. The presiding judge therefore did not abuse his authority in denying the motion.

(c) Litigants should observe the hierarchy of court in petitions for extraordinary writs. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction is concurrent with the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. Recourse to the Supreme Court is one of last resort, and special or compelling reason mus be alleged to warrant direct recourse.

Ferdinand A. Cruz v. Judge Henrick F. Gingoyon, et al., G.R. No. 170404, First Division, September 28, 2011.

In this case, the testimony of Dr. Balmaceda who is not an oncologist but a Medical Specialist of the DOH’s Operational and Management Services charged with receiving complaints against hospitals, does not qualify as expert testimony to establish the standard of care in obtaining consent for chemotherapy treatment.  In the absence of expert testimony in this regard, the Court feels hesitant in defining the scope of mandatory disclosure in cases of malpractice based on lack of informed consent, much less set a standard of disclosure that, even in foreign jurisdictions, has been noted to be an evolving one.

Li v. Soliman, 165279, June 11, 2011 (En Banc)

1)         A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective certification against forum shopping.

2)        As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The Court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.

3)        Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.

4)        As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of “substantial compliance” or presence of “special circumstances or compelling reasons.”

5)         The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.

6)        Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.

Formoso v. PNB, G.R. No. 154704, June 1, 2011 (Second Division), citing Oldarico S. Traveno v. Bobongon Banana Growers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, G.R. No. 164205, September 3, 2009, 598 SCRA 27 

“We have already spoken. Thus, this case should not be different from Serrano.

“As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. The general rule is supported by Article 7 of the Civil Code, which provides: Art. 7.   Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice to the contrary.

“The doctrine of operative fact serves as an exception to the aforementioned general rule. In Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, we held: ‘The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.’

“The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.

“Following Serrano, we hold that this case should not be included in the aforementioned exception. After all, it was not the fault of petitioner that he lost his job due to an act of illegal dismissal committed by respondents. To rule otherwise would be iniquitous to petitioner and other OFWs, and would, in effect, send a wrong signal that principals/employers and recruitment/manning agencies may violate an OFW’s security of tenure which an employment contract embodies and actually profit from such violation based on an unconstitutional provision of law.”

Yap v. Thenamaris Ship’s Management and Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc., G.R. No. 179532, May 30, 2011

Torrecampo v. MWSS, G.R. No. 188296, May 30, 2011

In this case, respondents’ possession of the eleven TCTs is not necessarily equivalent to ownership of the lands covered by the TCTs. The certificate of title, by itself, does not vest ownership; it is merely an evidence of title over a particular property. Again, the issue of ownership of the eleven properties must be litigated in the appropriate proceedings.”

Espino v. Bulut, G.R. No. 183811, May 30, 2011

Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 190660, April 11, 2011, Third Division